CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES Case Digest

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD vs. PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC. 

G.R. No. L-40245 1975 April 30 

Facts: The Philippine Airlines Inc provides both domestic and international air service. In its domestic service PAL provides, among others, services between Tuguegarao and Manila (designated as Flight 213) and between Baguio and Manila (designated as Flight 205). 

On May 12, 1970, PAL had an excess of twenty (20) passengers from Baguio to Manila who cannot be accommodated in its regular flight. To accommodate these twenty passengers, PAL required the aircraft operating Flight 213 (Tuguegarao to Manila) to pass Baguio City on its way to Manila and pick up these passengers. Flight 213 at that time was carrying only five (5) passengers. 

Claiming that PAL should have first obtained the permission of the CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD (CAB) before operating the flagstop and that such failure is a violation of Republic Act No. 776, the CAB imposed a fine of P5,000.00 upon PAL in a resolution. Upon motion for reconsideration filed by PAL, the CAB reduced the fine to P2,500.00. 

PAL, in its motion for reconsideration, argued that there is nothing in Republic Act No. 776 in general, nor in Section 42(k) thereof in particular, which expressly empowers CAB to impose a fine and order its payment in the manner pursued in this case and under CAB Resolution No. 109(70). It further stressed that "the power and authority to impose fines and penalties is a judicial function exercised through the regular courts of justice, and that such power and authority cannot be delegated to the Civil Aeronautics Board my mere implication or interpretation". 

Issue: Whether or not CAB possesses the necessary legal authority to impose a fine. 

Ruling: We have no quarrel with appellant PAL's contention that the C.A.B. has no power to impose fines in the nature of criminal penalty and that only courts of justice can do so. It could easily be discerned from a scrutiny of the provision on Chapter VII of Republic Act 776, on "Violation and penalties" that whenever the law provides a penalty for a violation involving fine and/or imprisonment (criminal in nature), the words "in the discretion of the court" always appear (Sec. 42 (E) (F) (G) (N) Republic Act 776) for the very simple reason that the C.A.B. is not authorized to impose a criminal penalty, but in those cases where the violation is punishable by a fine or civil penalty, the law does not include the words "in the discretion of the court. 

There exists but an insignificant doubt in Our mind that the C.A.B. is fully authorized by law (Republic Act 776) to impose fines in the nature of civil penalty for violations of its rules and regulations. To deprive the C.A.B. of that power would amount to an absurd interpretation of the pertinent legal provision because the CAB is given full power on its own initiative to determine whether to "impose, remit, mitigate, increase or compromise" "fines and civil penalties", a power which is expressly given to the Civil Aeronautics Administrator whose orders or decision may be reviewed, revised, reversed, modified or affirmed by the CAB. Besides, to deprive the C.A.B. of its power to impose civil penalties would negate its effective general supervision and control over air carriers if they can just disregard with impunity the rules and regulations designed to insure public safety and convenience in air transportation. If everytime the C.A.B. would like to impose a civil penalty on an erring airline for violation of its rules and regulations it would have to resort to courts of justice in protracted litigations then it could not serve its purpose of exercising a competent, efficient and effective supervision and control over air carriers in their vital role of rendering public service by affording safe and convenient air transit. 

There is no doubt that the fine imposed on appellant PAL in CAB resolution 109(70) and 132(70) is that fine or civil penalty contemplated and mentioned in the foregoing provisions of Republic Act 776 and not a fine in the nature of criminal penalty as contemplated in the Revised Penal Code, because the "fine" in this case was imposed by the C.A.B. because of appellant PAL's violation of C.A.B. rules on flagstops without previous authority on "May 12, 1970 and on previous occasions", said C.A.B. explaining clearly in its resolution No. 132(70) that the "imposition of the fine is not so much on exacting penalty for the violation committed as the need to stress upon the air carriers to desist from wanton disregard of existing rules, regulations or requirements of the government regulating agency. In other words, it is an administrative penalty which administrative officers are empowered to impose without criminal prosecution. 

Republic Act 776 created the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and the Civil Aeronautics Administration. In the exercise and performance of their powers and duties, they shall consider among other things, "as being in the public interest, and in accordance with the public convenience and necessity" certain declared policies which include — 

(c) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantage of, assure the highest degree of safety in, and foster sound economic condition in, such transportation, and to improve the relation between, and coordinate transportation by, air carriers; 

(f) To promote safety of flight in air commerce in the Philippines 

The CAB has the power to "investigate, upon complaint or upon its own initiative, whether any individual or air carrier, domestic or foreign, is violating any provision of this act, or the rules and regulations issued thereunder, and shall take such action, consistent with the provisions of this Act, as may be necessary to prevent further violation of such provision, or rules and regulations so issued" (Section 10(D) Republic Act 776). 

Likewise, the CAB has the power to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal any administrative decision or order" of the Civil Aeronautics Administrator on matters pertaining to "imposition of civil penalty or fine in connection with the violation of any provision of this Act or rules and regulations issued thereunder." It has the power also "either on its own initiative or upon review on appeal from an order or decision of the Civil Aeronautics Administrator, to determine whether to impose, remit, mitigate, increase, or compromise, such fine and civil penalties, as the case may be.

ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION vs NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY Case Digest

ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION v. THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY 

G.R. No. L-50444 August 31, 1987

FACTS: Jose Hernando acquired ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa Heights Subdivision from the petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation. On 28 August 1974, Mr. Hernando transferred his rights over Lot No. 15 to private respondent Virgilio Yuson. However, for failure of Antipolo Realty to develop the subdivision project, Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages pertaining to the period up to, and including, the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly installment payments falling due thereafter. On October 14 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a notice to private respondent Yuson advising that the required improvements in the subdivision had already been completed, and requesting resumption of payment of the monthly installments on Lot No. 15. 

Mr. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972-October 1976 monthly installments but agreed to pay the post October 1976 installments. Antipolo Realty responded by rescinding the Contract to Sell, and claiming the forfeiture of all installment payments previously made by Mr. Yuson. Mr. Yuson brought his dispute with Antipolo Realty before public respondent NHA. 

After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision on 9 March 1978 ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell. Antipolo Realty filed a Motion for Reconsideration asserting that the jurisdiction to hear and decide Mr. Yuson's complaint was lodged in the regular courts, not in the NHA. 

The motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent NHA, which sustained its jurisdiction to hear and decide the Yuson complaint. Hence, this petition. 

ISSUE: Whether or not NHA has jurisdiction over the present controversy. 

HELD: NHA was upheld by the SC. 

It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise and perform adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial authority to administrative agencies is well recognized in our jurisdiction, basically because the need for special competence and experience has been recognized as essential in the resolution of questions of complex or specialized character and because of a companion recognition that the dockets of our regular courts have remained crowded and clogged. In general the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. In the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. 

Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 957, known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Decree", states that National Housing Authority. — The National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this decree. Presidential Decree No. 1344, clarified and spelled out the quasi-judicial dimensions of the grant of regulatory authority to the NHA in the following manner: 

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: 

A. Unsound real estate business practices: 

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by sub- division lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and 

C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. 

The need for and therefore the scope of the regulatory authority thus lodged in the NHA are indicated in the second and third preambular paragraphs of the statute. There is no question that under Presidential Decree No. 957, the NHA was legally empowered to determine and protect the rights of contracting parties under the law administered by it and under the respective agreements, as well as to ensure that their obligations thereunder are faithfully performed.

RCPI vs NTC Case Digest

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI) vs. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC) and JUAN A. ALEGRE 

G.R. No. 93237 November 6, 1992 

Facts: Private respondent Juan A. Alegre's wife, Dr. Jimena Alegre, sent two (2) RUSH telegrams through petitioner RCPI's facilities in Taft Ave., Manila at 9:00 in the morning of 17 March 1989 to his sister and brother-in-law in Valencia, Bohol and another sister-in-law in Espiritu, Ilocos Norte. 

Both telegrams did not reach their destinations on the expected dates. So, private respondent filed a letter-complaint against RCPI with National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for poor service, with a request for the imposition of the appropriate punitive sanction against the company. Taking cognizance of the complaint, NTC directed RCPI to answer the complaint and set the initial hearing. 

NTC held that RCPI was administratively liable for deficient and inadequate service under Section 19(a) of C.A. 146 and imposed the penalty of fine payable within thirty (30) days from receipt in the aggregate amount of one thousand pesos. 

Hence, RCPI filed this petition for review invoking C.A. 146 Sec. 19(a) which limits the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission (precursor of the NTC) to the fixing of rates. 

ISSUE: Whether or not Public Service Commission (precursor of the NTC) has jurisdiction to impose fines 

HELD: The decision appealed from is reversed and set aside for lack of jurisdiction of the NTC to render it. 

NTC has no jurisdiction to impose a fine. Under Section 21 of C. A. 146, as amended, the Commission was empowered to impose an administrative fine in cases of violation of or failure by a public service to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission. Petitioner operated under a legislative franchise, so there were no terms nor conditions of any certificate issued by the Commission to violate. Neither was there any order, decision or regulation from the Commission applicable to petitioner that the latter had allegedly violated, disobeyed, defied or disregarded. 

No substantial change has been brought about by Executive Order No. 546 invoked by the Solicitor General's Office to bolster NTC's jurisdiction. The Executive Order is not an explicit grant of power to impose administrative fines on public service utilities, including telegraphic agencies, which have failed to render adequate service to consumers. Neither has it expanded the coverage of the supervisory and regulatory power of the agency. There appears to be no alternative but to reiterate the settled doctrine in administrative law that: 

Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective (Globe Wireless case).