CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES Case Digest

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD vs. PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC. 

G.R. No. L-40245 1975 April 30 

Facts: The Philippine Airlines Inc provides both domestic and international air service. In its domestic service PAL provides, among others, services between Tuguegarao and Manila (designated as Flight 213) and between Baguio and Manila (designated as Flight 205). 

On May 12, 1970, PAL had an excess of twenty (20) passengers from Baguio to Manila who cannot be accommodated in its regular flight. To accommodate these twenty passengers, PAL required the aircraft operating Flight 213 (Tuguegarao to Manila) to pass Baguio City on its way to Manila and pick up these passengers. Flight 213 at that time was carrying only five (5) passengers. 

Claiming that PAL should have first obtained the permission of the CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD (CAB) before operating the flagstop and that such failure is a violation of Republic Act No. 776, the CAB imposed a fine of P5,000.00 upon PAL in a resolution. Upon motion for reconsideration filed by PAL, the CAB reduced the fine to P2,500.00. 

PAL, in its motion for reconsideration, argued that there is nothing in Republic Act No. 776 in general, nor in Section 42(k) thereof in particular, which expressly empowers CAB to impose a fine and order its payment in the manner pursued in this case and under CAB Resolution No. 109(70). It further stressed that "the power and authority to impose fines and penalties is a judicial function exercised through the regular courts of justice, and that such power and authority cannot be delegated to the Civil Aeronautics Board my mere implication or interpretation". 

Issue: Whether or not CAB possesses the necessary legal authority to impose a fine. 

Ruling: We have no quarrel with appellant PAL's contention that the C.A.B. has no power to impose fines in the nature of criminal penalty and that only courts of justice can do so. It could easily be discerned from a scrutiny of the provision on Chapter VII of Republic Act 776, on "Violation and penalties" that whenever the law provides a penalty for a violation involving fine and/or imprisonment (criminal in nature), the words "in the discretion of the court" always appear (Sec. 42 (E) (F) (G) (N) Republic Act 776) for the very simple reason that the C.A.B. is not authorized to impose a criminal penalty, but in those cases where the violation is punishable by a fine or civil penalty, the law does not include the words "in the discretion of the court. 

There exists but an insignificant doubt in Our mind that the C.A.B. is fully authorized by law (Republic Act 776) to impose fines in the nature of civil penalty for violations of its rules and regulations. To deprive the C.A.B. of that power would amount to an absurd interpretation of the pertinent legal provision because the CAB is given full power on its own initiative to determine whether to "impose, remit, mitigate, increase or compromise" "fines and civil penalties", a power which is expressly given to the Civil Aeronautics Administrator whose orders or decision may be reviewed, revised, reversed, modified or affirmed by the CAB. Besides, to deprive the C.A.B. of its power to impose civil penalties would negate its effective general supervision and control over air carriers if they can just disregard with impunity the rules and regulations designed to insure public safety and convenience in air transportation. If everytime the C.A.B. would like to impose a civil penalty on an erring airline for violation of its rules and regulations it would have to resort to courts of justice in protracted litigations then it could not serve its purpose of exercising a competent, efficient and effective supervision and control over air carriers in their vital role of rendering public service by affording safe and convenient air transit. 

There is no doubt that the fine imposed on appellant PAL in CAB resolution 109(70) and 132(70) is that fine or civil penalty contemplated and mentioned in the foregoing provisions of Republic Act 776 and not a fine in the nature of criminal penalty as contemplated in the Revised Penal Code, because the "fine" in this case was imposed by the C.A.B. because of appellant PAL's violation of C.A.B. rules on flagstops without previous authority on "May 12, 1970 and on previous occasions", said C.A.B. explaining clearly in its resolution No. 132(70) that the "imposition of the fine is not so much on exacting penalty for the violation committed as the need to stress upon the air carriers to desist from wanton disregard of existing rules, regulations or requirements of the government regulating agency. In other words, it is an administrative penalty which administrative officers are empowered to impose without criminal prosecution. 

Republic Act 776 created the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and the Civil Aeronautics Administration. In the exercise and performance of their powers and duties, they shall consider among other things, "as being in the public interest, and in accordance with the public convenience and necessity" certain declared policies which include — 

(c) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantage of, assure the highest degree of safety in, and foster sound economic condition in, such transportation, and to improve the relation between, and coordinate transportation by, air carriers; 

(f) To promote safety of flight in air commerce in the Philippines 

The CAB has the power to "investigate, upon complaint or upon its own initiative, whether any individual or air carrier, domestic or foreign, is violating any provision of this act, or the rules and regulations issued thereunder, and shall take such action, consistent with the provisions of this Act, as may be necessary to prevent further violation of such provision, or rules and regulations so issued" (Section 10(D) Republic Act 776). 

Likewise, the CAB has the power to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal any administrative decision or order" of the Civil Aeronautics Administrator on matters pertaining to "imposition of civil penalty or fine in connection with the violation of any provision of this Act or rules and regulations issued thereunder." It has the power also "either on its own initiative or upon review on appeal from an order or decision of the Civil Aeronautics Administrator, to determine whether to impose, remit, mitigate, increase, or compromise, such fine and civil penalties, as the case may be.

ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION vs NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY Case Digest

ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION v. THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY 

G.R. No. L-50444 August 31, 1987

FACTS: Jose Hernando acquired ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa Heights Subdivision from the petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation. On 28 August 1974, Mr. Hernando transferred his rights over Lot No. 15 to private respondent Virgilio Yuson. However, for failure of Antipolo Realty to develop the subdivision project, Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages pertaining to the period up to, and including, the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly installment payments falling due thereafter. On October 14 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a notice to private respondent Yuson advising that the required improvements in the subdivision had already been completed, and requesting resumption of payment of the monthly installments on Lot No. 15. 

Mr. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972-October 1976 monthly installments but agreed to pay the post October 1976 installments. Antipolo Realty responded by rescinding the Contract to Sell, and claiming the forfeiture of all installment payments previously made by Mr. Yuson. Mr. Yuson brought his dispute with Antipolo Realty before public respondent NHA. 

After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision on 9 March 1978 ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell. Antipolo Realty filed a Motion for Reconsideration asserting that the jurisdiction to hear and decide Mr. Yuson's complaint was lodged in the regular courts, not in the NHA. 

The motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent NHA, which sustained its jurisdiction to hear and decide the Yuson complaint. Hence, this petition. 

ISSUE: Whether or not NHA has jurisdiction over the present controversy. 

HELD: NHA was upheld by the SC. 

It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise and perform adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial authority to administrative agencies is well recognized in our jurisdiction, basically because the need for special competence and experience has been recognized as essential in the resolution of questions of complex or specialized character and because of a companion recognition that the dockets of our regular courts have remained crowded and clogged. In general the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. In the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. 

Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 957, known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Decree", states that National Housing Authority. — The National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this decree. Presidential Decree No. 1344, clarified and spelled out the quasi-judicial dimensions of the grant of regulatory authority to the NHA in the following manner: 

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: 

A. Unsound real estate business practices: 

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by sub- division lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and 

C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. 

The need for and therefore the scope of the regulatory authority thus lodged in the NHA are indicated in the second and third preambular paragraphs of the statute. There is no question that under Presidential Decree No. 957, the NHA was legally empowered to determine and protect the rights of contracting parties under the law administered by it and under the respective agreements, as well as to ensure that their obligations thereunder are faithfully performed.

RCPI vs NTC Case Digest

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI) vs. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC) and JUAN A. ALEGRE 

G.R. No. 93237 November 6, 1992 

Facts: Private respondent Juan A. Alegre's wife, Dr. Jimena Alegre, sent two (2) RUSH telegrams through petitioner RCPI's facilities in Taft Ave., Manila at 9:00 in the morning of 17 March 1989 to his sister and brother-in-law in Valencia, Bohol and another sister-in-law in Espiritu, Ilocos Norte. 

Both telegrams did not reach their destinations on the expected dates. So, private respondent filed a letter-complaint against RCPI with National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for poor service, with a request for the imposition of the appropriate punitive sanction against the company. Taking cognizance of the complaint, NTC directed RCPI to answer the complaint and set the initial hearing. 

NTC held that RCPI was administratively liable for deficient and inadequate service under Section 19(a) of C.A. 146 and imposed the penalty of fine payable within thirty (30) days from receipt in the aggregate amount of one thousand pesos. 

Hence, RCPI filed this petition for review invoking C.A. 146 Sec. 19(a) which limits the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission (precursor of the NTC) to the fixing of rates. 

ISSUE: Whether or not Public Service Commission (precursor of the NTC) has jurisdiction to impose fines 

HELD: The decision appealed from is reversed and set aside for lack of jurisdiction of the NTC to render it. 

NTC has no jurisdiction to impose a fine. Under Section 21 of C. A. 146, as amended, the Commission was empowered to impose an administrative fine in cases of violation of or failure by a public service to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission. Petitioner operated under a legislative franchise, so there were no terms nor conditions of any certificate issued by the Commission to violate. Neither was there any order, decision or regulation from the Commission applicable to petitioner that the latter had allegedly violated, disobeyed, defied or disregarded. 

No substantial change has been brought about by Executive Order No. 546 invoked by the Solicitor General's Office to bolster NTC's jurisdiction. The Executive Order is not an explicit grant of power to impose administrative fines on public service utilities, including telegraphic agencies, which have failed to render adequate service to consumers. Neither has it expanded the coverage of the supervisory and regulatory power of the agency. There appears to be no alternative but to reiterate the settled doctrine in administrative law that: 

Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective (Globe Wireless case).

EPZA vs. Commission on Human Rights Case Digest

EPZA vs. Commission on Human Rights

G.R. No. 101476 April 14, 1992 

Facts: EPZA (petitioner) purchase a parcel of land from Filoil Refinery Corporation, and before petitioner could take possession of the area, several individuals had entered the premises and planted agricultural products therein without permission from EPZA or its predecessor, Filoil. EPZA paid a P10,000-financial-assistance to those who accepted the same and signed quitclaims. Among them were private respondents (TERESITA VALLES, LORETO ALEDIA). Ten years later, respondent Teresita, Loreto and Pedro, filed in the respondent Commission on Human Rights (CHR) a joint complaint praying for "justice and other reliefs and remedies". Alleged in their complaint was the information that EPZA bulldozed the area with acts in violation of their human rights. CHR issued an Order of injunction commanding EPZA to desist from committing such acts . Two weeks later, EPZA again bulldozed the area. They allegedly handcuffed private respondent Teresita Valles, pointed their firearms at the other respondents, and fired a shot in the air. CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista issued another injunction Order reiterating her first order and expanded it to include the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, the contractors, and their subordinates. 

EPZA filed in the CHR a motion to lift the Order of Injunction for lack of authority to issue injunctive writs and temporary restraining orders, but same was denied by the Commission (CHR). 

Hence, EPZA, filed in SC this special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, alleging that the CHR acted in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. A temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued ordering the CHR to cease and desist from enforcing and/or implementing the questioned injunction orders. 

In its comment on the petition, the CHR asked for the immediate lifting of the restraining order. The CHR contends that it’s principal function under Section 18, Art. 13 of the 1987 Constitution, "is not limited to mere investigation" because it is mandated, among others to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the under privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection. 

Issue: WON CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against supposed violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts complained of. 

Held: Petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The orders of injunction issued by the respondent Commission on Human Right are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the TRO which this Court issued is made PERMANENT. 

In Hon. Isidro Cariño, et al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al., we held that the CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body. 

“The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.” 

The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication. 

The "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. It may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in any action pending in an inferior court within his district." (Sec. 2, Rule 58, Rules of Court). A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no other purpose.

SANDOVAL vs. COMELEC Case Digest

FEDERICO S. SANDOVAL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

[G.R. No.133842. January 26, 2000] 

FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent herein were candidates for the congressional seat for the Malabon-Navotas legislative district during the elections held on May 11, 1998. After canvassing the municipal certificates of canvass, the district board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner the duly elected congressman. The petitioner took his oath of office on the same day. Private respondent filed with the Comelec a petition, which sought the annulment of petitioner's proclamation. He alleged that there was a verbal order from the Comelec Chairman to suspend the canvass and proclamation of the winning candidate, but the district board of canvassers proceeded with the canvass and proclamation despite the said verbal order. He also alleged that there was non-inclusion of 19 election returns in the canvass, which would result in an incomplete canvass of the election returns. The Comelec en banc issued an order setting aside the proclamation of petitioner and ruled the proclamation as void. Hence, this petition for certiorari seeking the annulment and reversal of the Comelec order. 

ISSUES: 

1. whether the COMELEC has the power to take cognizance of SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98- 206 

SPC No. 98-143 an "Urgent Appeal from the Decision of the Legislative District Board of Canvassers for Malabon and Navotas with Prayer for the Nullification of the Proclamation of Federico S. Sandoval as Congressman." 

SPC No. 98-206. The petition sought the annulment of petitioner's proclamation as congressman. 

2. whether the COMELEC's order to set aside petitioner's proclamation was valid. 

RULING: On the first issue, we uphold the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the petitions filed by private respondent. The COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies. As an exception, however, to the general rule, Section 15 of Republic Act (RA) 7166 prohibits candidates in the presidential, vice-presidential, senatorial and congressional elections from filing pre-proclamation cases. It states: "Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation cases Not Allowed in Elections for President, Vice-President, Senator, and Members of the House of Representatives. — For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or the certificates of canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it." The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the winner in the election, which delay might result in a vacuum in these sensitive posts. The law, nonetheless, provides an exception to the exception. The second sentence of Section 15 allows the filing of petitions for correction of manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns even in elections for president, vice-president and members of the House of Representatives for the simple reason that the correction of manifest error will not prolong the process of canvassing nor delay the proclamation of the winner in the election. This rule is consistent with and complements the authority of the COMELEC under the Constitution to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall" and its power to "decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections." 

We now go to the second issue. Although the COMELEC is clothed with jurisdiction over the subject matter and issue of SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206, we find the exercise of its jurisdiction tainted with illegality. We hold that its order to set aside the proclamation of petitioner is invalid for having been rendered without due process of law. Procedural due process demands prior notice and hearing. The facts show that COMELEC set aside the proclamation of petitioner without the benefit of prior notice and hearing and it rendered the questioned order based solely on private respondent's allegations. 

Public respondent submits that procedural due process need not be observed in this case because it was merely exercising its administrative power to review, revise and reverse the actions of the board of canvassers. 

We cannot accept public respondent's argument. 

Taking cognizance of private respondent's petitions for annulment of petitioner's proclamation, COMELEC was not merely performing an administrative function. The administrative powers of the COMELEC include the power to determine the number and location of polling places, appoint election officials and inspectors, conduct registration of voters, deputize law enforcement agencies and government instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, register political parties, organizations or coalitions, accredit citizens' arms of the Commission, prosecute election offenses, and recommend to the President the removal of or imposition of any other disciplinary action upon any officer or employee it has deputized for violation or disregard of its directive, order or decision. In addition, the Commission also has direct control and supervision over all personnel involved in the conduct of election. However, the resolution of the adverse claims of private respondent and petitioner as regards the existence of a manifest error in the questioned certificate of canvass requires the COMELEC to act as an arbiter. It behooves the Commission to hear both parties to determine the veracity of their allegations and to decide whether the alleged error is a manifest error. Hence, the resolution of this issue calls for the exercise by the COMELEC of its quasi-judicial power. It has been said that where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial. The COMELEC therefore, acting as quasi-judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the requirements of procedural due process in resolving the petitions filed by private respondent. 

The COMELEC order dated June 2, 1998 in SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206 is ANNULLED.

UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL, INC. vs. COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS Case Digest

THE UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL, INC. vs. COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS 

FACTS: 

• The property being fought over by the parties is a 10.36-hectare property in Baguio City called Dominican Hills, formerly registered in the name of Diplomat Hills, Inc. 
• The property was mortgaged to the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) which eventually foreclosed the mortgage thereon and acquired the same as highest bidder. 
• On April 11, 1983, it was donated to the Republic of the Philippines by UCPB through its President, Eduardo Cojuangco. The deed of donation stipulated that Dominican Hills would be utilized for the "priority programs, projects, activities in human settlements and economic development and governmental purposes" of the Ministry of Human Settlements. 
• President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 85 abolishing the Office of Media Affairs and the Ministry of Human Settlements. All agencies under the latter's supervision as well as all its assets, programs and projects, were transferred to the Presidential Management Staff (PMS). 
• On October 18, 1988, the PMS received an application from petitioner UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL, INC to acquire a portion of the Dominican Hills property. 
• HOME INSURANCE GUARANTY CORPORATION (HIGC) consented to act as originator for UNITED. A Memorandum of Agreement was signed by and among the PMS, the HIGC, and UNITED. The Memorandum of Agreement called for the PMS to sell the Dominican Hills property to HIGC which would, in turn, sell the same to UNITED. The parties agreed on a selling price of P75.00 per square meter. 
• Private respondents entered the Dominican Hills property allocated to UNITED and constructed houses thereon. Petitioner was able to secure a demolition order from the city mayor. 
• Unable to stop the razing of their houses, private respondents, under the name DOMINICAN HILL BAGUIO RESIDENTS HOMELESS ASSOCIATION filed an action for injunction, in the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 4. Private respondents were able to obtain a temporary restraining order but their prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was later denied in an Order dated March 18, 1996. 
• While Civil Case No. 3316-R was pending, the ASSOCIATION, this time represented by the Land Reform Beneficiaries Association, Inc filed a complaint praying for damages, injunction and annulment of the said Memorandum of Agreement between UNITED and HIGC. 
• Demolition Order No. 1-96 was subsequently implemented by the Office of the City Mayor and the City Engineer's Office of Baguio City. However, petitioner avers that private respondents returned and reconstructed the demolished structures. 
• To forestall the re-implementation of the demolition order, private respondents filed on September 29, 1998 a petition for annulment of contracts with prayer for a temporary restraining order in the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) against petitioner, HIGC, PMS, the City Engineer's Office, the City Mayor, as well as the Register of Deeds of Baguio City. On the very same day, public respondent COSLAP issued the contested order requiring the parties to maintain the status quo. 
• Without filing a motion for reconsideration from the aforesaid status quo order, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP.

ISSUE: IS THE COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS [COSLAP] CREATED UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 561 BY THE OFFICE OF THE PHILIPPINES EMPOWERED TO HEAR AND TRY A PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF CONTRACTS WITH PRAYER FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND THUS, ARROGATE UNTO ITSELF THE POWER TO ISSUE STATUS QUO ORDER AND CONDUCT A HEARING THEREOF? 

ASSUMING THAT THE COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS HAS JURISDICTION ON THE MATTER, IS IT EXEMPTED FROM OBSERVING A CLEAR CASE OF FORUM SHOPPING ON THE PART OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS? 

RULING: 

1. COSLAP is not justified in assuming jurisdiction over the controversy. It may not assume jurisdiction over cases which are already pending in the regular courts. 

• Section 3(2) of Executive Order 561 speaks of any resolution, order or decision of the COSLAP as having the "force and effect of a regular administrative resolution, order or decision." The qualification places an unmistakable emphasis on the administrative character of the COSLAP's determination, amplified by the statement that such resolutions, orders or decisions "shall be binding upon the parties therein and upon the agency having jurisdiction over the same." An agency is defined by statute as "any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein." 
• section 3(2) of Executive Order 561 patently indicates that the COSLAP's dispositions are binding on administrative or executive agencies. 

2. Private respondents, in filing multiple petitions, have mocked our attempts to eradicate forum shopping and have thereby upset the orderly administration of justice. They sought recourse from three (3) different tribunals in order to obtain the writ of injunction they so desperately desired. 

• A scrutiny of the pleadings filed before the trial courts and the COSLAP sufficiently establishes private respondents' propensity for forum shopping. We lay the premise that the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the plaintiff or principal party, and not by his counsel. Hence, one can deduce that the certification is a peculiar personal representation on the part of the principal party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action. In the case at bar, private respondents' litany of omissions range from failing to submit the required certification against forum shopping to filing a false certification, and then to forum shopping itself. First, the petition filed before the COSLAP conspicuously lacked a certification against forum shopping. Second, it does not appear from the record that the ASSOCIATION informed Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City before which Civil Case No. 3316-R was pending, that another action, Civil Case No. 3382-R, was filed before Branch 61 of the same court. Another group of homeless residents of Dominican Hill, the LAND REFORM BENEFICIARIES ASSOCIATION, INC. initiated the latter case.

OSEA vs AMBROSIO Case Digest

EDMUNDO T. OSEA, et al. v. ANTONIO G. AMBROSIO, et al. 

486 SCRA 599 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) 

The doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction provides that courts cannot or will not determine a controversy where the issues call for the exercise of sound administrative discretion. 

FACTS: The Contract to Sell executed by spouses Edmundo T. Osea and Ligaya R. Osea and respondent Antonio Ambrosio, involves the sale and purchase of a ―house and lot unit‖ in Villa San Agustin Subdivision, a lowcost housing and lot project. Even after signing the Deed of Sale on the lot, Spouses Osea stipulated that the house would be constructed in accordance with, inter alia, the terms of the Contract to Sell, wherein respondent Ambrosio contracted his co-respondent Rodolfo C. Perez to construct the Spouses Osea‘s house in accordance with the Specifications in the Contract to Sell, the Bill of Materials, and Approved Building Plan by the Building Official of Quezon City. 

Ligaya Osea executed a Certificate of Lot and House Acceptance and thereafter occupied it. A month after occupying the house, its front and back walls cracked. Spouses Osea filed a complaint for damages against respondents Ambrosio and Perez before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. 

Respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC over the complaint for damages, contending that it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). 

ISSUE: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint damages based on the violation or deviation from the approved subdivision plan 

HELD: The Court of Appeals, by Decision which is being challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari, declared null and void the trial court‘s Decision for lack of jurisdiction as it is the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) which has jurisdiction over the complaint. 

The appellate court did not thus err when it characterized petitioners complaint for damages as based on the violation or deviation from the ―approved subdivision plan‖. ―Sale‖ and ―purchase‖ of subdivision lots under P.D. 957 explicitly include the sale and purchase of buildings and other improvements thereon which form an integral part of the approved subdivision plan. 

The extent to which the HLURB has been vested with quasi-judicial authority must also be determined by referring to the terms of P.D. No. 957, ―THE SUBDIVISION AND CONDOMINIUM BUYERS' PROTECTIVE DECREE.‖ Section 3 of this statute provides the HLUB has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this Decree. 

Agilent Technologies Singapore vs. Integrated Silicon Techngology Philippines Corp. Case Digest

Agilent Technologies Singapore vs. Integrated Silicon Techngology Philippines Corp.

[GR 154618, 14 April 2004]

Facts: Agilent Technologies Singapore (Pte.), Ltd. is a foreign corporation, which, by its own admission, is not licensed to do business in the Philippines. Integrated Silicon Technology Philippines Corporation is a private domestic corporation, 100% foreign owned, which is engaged in the business of manufacturing and assembling electronics components. Teoh Kiang Hong, Teoh Kiang Seng and Anthony Choo, Malaysian nationals, are current members of Integrated Silicon’s board of directors, while Joanne Kate M. dela Cruz, Jean Kay M. dela Cruz, and Rolando T. Nacilla are its former members. The juridical relation among the various parties in the case can be traced to a 5-year Value Added Assembly Services Agreement (VAASA), entered into on 2 April 1996 between Integrated Silicon and the Hewlett-Packard Singapore (Pte.) Ltd., Singapore Components Operation (HP-Singapore). Under the terms of the VAASA, Integrated Silicon was to locally manufacture and assemble fiber optics for export to HP-Singapore. 

HP-Singapore, for its part, was to consign raw materials to Integrated Silicon; transport machinery to the plant of Integrated Silicon; and pay Integrated Silicon the purchase price of the finished products. The VAASA had a five-year term, beginning on 2 April 1996, with a provision for annual renewal by mutual written consent. On 19 September 1999, with the consent of Integrated Silicon, HP-Singapore assigned all its rights and obligations in the VAASA to Agilent. On 25 May 2001, Integrated Silicon filed a complaint for “Specific Performance and Damages” against Agilent and its officers Tan Bian Ee, Lim Chin Hong, Tey Boon Teck and Francis Khor (Civil Case 3110-01-C), alleging that Agilent breached the parties’ oral agreement to extend the VAASA. Integrated Silicon thus prayed that Agilent be ordered to execute a written extension of the VAASA for a period of five years as earlier assured and promised; to comply with the extended VAASA; and to pay actual, moral, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. 

On 1 June 2001, summons and a copy of the complaint were served on Atty. Ramon Quisumbing, who returned these processes on the claim that he was not the registered agent of Agilent. Later, he entered a special appearance to assail the court’s jurisdiction over the person of Agilent. On 2 July 2001, Agilent filed a separate complaint against Integrated Silicon, Teoh Kang Seng, Teoh Kiang Gong, Anthony Choo, Joanne Kate M. dela Cruz, Jean Kay M. dela Cruz and Rolando T. Nacilla, for “Specific Performance, Recovery of Possession, and Sum of Money with Replevin, Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and Damages”, before the Regional Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna, Branch 92 (Civil Case 3123-2001-C). Agilent prayed that a writ of replevin or, in the alternative, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, be issued ordering Integrated Silicon, et. al. to immediately return and deliver to Agilent its equipment, machineries and the materials to be used for fiber-optic components which were left in the plant of Integrated Silicon; and that the latter be ordered to pay actual and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Integrated Silicon, et. al. filed a Motion to Dismiss in Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C, on the grounds of lack of Agilent’s legal capacity to sue; litis pendentia; forum shopping; and failure to state a cause of action. On 4 September 2001, the trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss and granted Agilent’s application for a writ of replevin. 

Without filing a motion for reconsideration, Integrated Silicon, et. al. filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. In the meantime, upon motion filed by Integrated Silicon, et. al., Judge Antonio S. Pozas of Branch 92 voluntarily inhibited himself in Civil Case 3123-2001-C. The case was re-raffled and assigned to Branch 35, the same branch where Civil Case 3110-2001-C is pending. On 12 August 2002, the Court of Appeals granted Integrated Silicon, et. al.’s petition for certiorari, set aside the assailed Order of the trial court dated 4 September 2001, and ordered the dismissal of Civil Case 3123-2001-C. Agilent filed the petition for review. 

Issue:

1. Whether a foreign corporation without a license is incapacitated from bringing an action in Philippine courts. 
2. Whether Agilent was doing business in the Philippines. 

Held: 

1. A foreign corporation without a license is not ipso facto incapacitated from bringing an action in Philippine courts. A license is necessary only if a foreign corporation is “transacting” or “doing business” in the country. Section 133 of the Corporation Code provides that "No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws." The aforementioned provision prevents an unlicensed foreign corporation “doing business” in the Philippines from accessing our courts. In a number of cases, however, the Court held that an unlicensed foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may bring suit in Philippine courts against a Philippine citizen or entity who had contracted with and benefited from said corporation. Such a suit is premised on the doctrine of estoppel. A party is estopped from challenging the personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it. This doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence and capacity applies to foreign as well as domestic corporations. The application of this principle prevents a person contracting with a foreign corporation from later taking advantage of its noncompliance with the statutes chiefly in cases where such person has received the benefits of the contract. The principles regarding the right of a foreign corporation to bring suit in Philippine courts may thus be condensed in four statements: (1) if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines without a license, it cannot sue before the Philippine courts; (2) if a foreign corporation is not doing business in the Philippines, it needs no license to sue before Philippine courts on an isolated transaction or on a cause of action entirely independent of any business transaction; (3) if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines without a license, a Philippine citizen or entity which has contracted with said corporation may be estopped from challenging the foreign corporation’s corporate personality in a suit brought before Philippine courts; and (4) if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines with the required license, it can sue before Philippine courts on any transaction. 

2. The challenge to Agilent’s legal capacity to file suit hinges on whether or not it is doing business in the Philippines. However, there is no definitive rule on what constitutes “doing”, “engaging in”, or “transacting” business in the Philippines, the Corporation Code itself is silent as to what acts constitute doing or transacting business in the Philippines. An analysis of the relevant case law, in conjunction with Section 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 (FIA, as amended by RA 8179), would demonstrate that the acts enumerated in the VAASA do not constitute “doing business” in the Philippines. Section 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the FIA (as amended by RA 8179) provides that the following shall not be deemed “doing business”: (1) Mere investment as a shareholder by a foreign entity in domestic corporations duly registered to do business, and/or the exercise of rights as such investor; (2) Having a nominee director or officer to represent its interest in such corporation; (3) Appointing a representative or distributor domiciled in the Philippines which transacts business in the representative’s or distributor’s own name and account; (4) The publication of a general advertisement through any print or broadcast media; (5) Maintaining a stock of goods in the Philippines solely for the purpose of having the same processed by another entity in the Philippines; (6) Consignment by a foreign entity of equipment with a local company to be used in the processing of products for export; (7) Collecting information in the Philippines; and (8) Performing services auxiliary to an existing isolated contract of sale which are not on a continuing basis, such as installing in the Philippines machinery it has manufactured or exported to the Philippines, servicing the same, training domestic workers to operate it, and similar incidental services. By and large, to constitute “doing business”, the activity to be undertaken in the Philippines is one that is for profit-making. Herein, by the clear terms of the VAASA, Agilent’s activities in the Philippines were confined to (1) maintaining a stock of goods in the Philippines solely for the purpose of having the same processed by Integrated Silicon; and (2) consignment of equipment with Integrated Silicon to be used in the processing of products for export. As such, Agilent cannot be deemed to be “doing business” in the Philippines. Integrated Silicon, et. al.’s contention that Agilent lacks the legal capacity to file suit is therefore devoid of merit. As a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines, it needed no license before it can sue before our courts.

GONZALES vs PAGCOR Case Digest

RAMON A. GONZALES v. PHILIPPINES AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, et al. 

429 SCRA 533 (2004), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) 

While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operator’s and/or management contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share its franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR can not delegate its power in view of the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest, inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly authorized to do so. 

FACTS: Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, as a citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar, filed a Petition seeking to restrain respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) from continuing its operations and prohibit it and its co-respondents Sports and Games Entertainment Corporation (SAGE), Best World Gaming and Entertainment Corporation (BEST WORLD), Belle Jai-alai Corporation (BELLE) and Filipinas Gaming Entertainment Totalizator Corporation (FILGAME)from enforcing: (1) the Grant of an Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gambling executed between PAGCOR and SAGE; (2) the Grant of Authority to Operate Computerized Bingo Games between PAGCOR and BEST WORLD; and (3) the ―Agreement‖ among PAGCOR, BELLE and FILGAME to conduct jai-alai operations.
 In Del Mar v. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., et al., the Court enjoined PAGCOR, BELLE, and FILGAME from managing, maintaining and operating jai-alai games and from enforcing the agreement entered into by them for that purpose. Then, PAGCOR et al. filed several motions for clarification, which the Supreme Court denied. 

Respondents BELLE and FILGAME filed a Manifestation stating that they were impleaded in the instant petition by reason of the agreement which they executed with PAGCOR. The said agreement was already declared invalid by the Supreme Court. In its comment, the respondent BEST WORLD stated that it had been unable to operate its bingo terminals and bingo games since its closure and shut down by PAGCOR and DILG. 

ISSUE: 

1. Whether or not Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1869, as amended (the PAGCOR Charter), is unconstitutional for having been issued pursuant to an unlawful exercise of legislative power by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos 
2. Whether or not the contracts entered into by PAGCOR with its BELLE and FILGAME are void for being undue delegations by PAGCOR of its franchise to operate and maintain gambling casinos, sports, gaming pools and the like 

HELD: 

That the P.D. 1869 has been rendered moot and academic 

In assailing the constitutionality of P.D. 1869, Gonzales does not point to any inconsistency between it and the present Constitution. Instead, it questions its issuance as an illegal exercise of legislative powers by then President Marcos. 

Indeed, while Gonzales made several poignant observations regarding the jurisprudence in the foregoing cases, the Court is unable to accept his invitation to re-examine said cases for the simple reason that the power conferred on it by the Constitution is limited to the adjudication of actual controversies and the determination of whether a branch or instrumentality of the government has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Even with its expanded jurisdiction, it is beyond the powers of this Court to re-write history. 

Since Gonzeles did not endeavor to show that P.D. 1869 itself is inconsistent with the Constitution, his prayer that PAGCOR be enjoined from continuing its operations and doing acts in furtherance of its existence must necessarily be denied. 

Movants may derive some satisfaction in the knowledge that Gonzales‘ prayer that respondents be enjoined from enforcing the "Agreement" among PAGCOR, BELLE and FILGAME to conduct jaialai operations and the "Grant of an Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gambling" between PAGCOR and SAGE had been granted, albeit in the separate aforementioned cases of Del Mar and Jaworski. 

That the contracts entered into by PAGCOR with BELLE and FILGAME is void 

The second issue has already been raised in the Del Mar cases, this Court ruling that PAGCOR "has a valid franchise to, but only by itself (i.e., not in association with any other person or entity) operate, maintain and/or manage the game of jai-alai," and that, consequently, the Agreement of June 17, 1999 among PAGCOR, BELLE and FILGAME was without force and effect. 

While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operator‘s and/or management contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share its franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR can not delegate its power in view of the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest, inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly authorized to do so. In Lim v. Pacquing, the Court clarified that "since ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate the jai-alai, it may not so operate even if it has a license or permit from the City Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila." By the same token, SAGE has to obtain a separate legislative franchise and not "ride on" PAGCOR‘s franchise if it were to legally operate on-line Internet gambling. 

Luzon Stevedoring Corporation vs. CA Case Digest

Luzon Stevedoring Corporation vs. Court of Appeals 

(156 SCRA 169) 

Facts: A maritime collision occurred between the tanker CAVITE owned by LSCO and MV Fernando Escano (a passenger ship) owned by Escano, as a result the passenger ship sunk. An action in admiralty was filed by Escano against Luzon. The trial court held that LSCO Cavite was solely to blame for the collision and held that Luzon’s claim that its liability should be limited under Article 837 of the Code of Commerce has not been established. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The SC also affirmed the CA. Upon two motions for reconsideration, the Supreme Court gave course to the petition. 

Issue: Whether or not in order to claim limited liability under Article 837 of the Code of Commerce, it is necessary that the owner abandon the vessel 

Held: Yes, abandonment is necessary to claim the limited liability wherein it shall be limited to the value of the vessel with all the appurtenances and freightage earned in the voyage. However, if the injury was due to the ship owner’s fault, the ship owner may not avail of his right to avail of limited liability by abandoning the vessel. 

The real nature of the liability of the ship owner or agent is embodied in the Code of Commerce. Articles 587, 590 and 837 are intended to limit the liability of the ship owner, provided that the owner or agent abandons the vessel. Although Article 837 does not specifically provide that in case of collision there should be abandonment, to enjoy such limited liability, said article is a mere amplification of the provisions of Articles 587 and 590 which makes it a mere superfluity. 

The exception to this rule in Article 837 is when the vessel is totally lost in which case there is no vessel to abandon, thus abandonment is not required. Because of such loss, the liability of the owner or agent is extinguished. However, they are still personally liable for claims under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and for repairs on the vessel prior to its loss. 

In case of illegal or tortious acts of the captain, the liability of the owner and agent is subsidiary. In such cases, the owner or agent may avail of Article 837 by abandoning the vessel. But if the injury is caused by the owner’s fault as where he engages the services of an inexperienced captain or engineer, he cannot avail of the provisions of Article 837 by abandoning the vessel. He is personally liable for such damages. 

In this case, the Court held that the petitioner is a t fault and since he did not abandon the vessel, he cannot invoke the benefit of Article 837 to limit his liability to the value of the vessel, all appurtenances and freightage earned during the voyage.